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Introduction
The events of 2007/2008
and those of 2010/2011
have unfortunately been
more than an alarm-bell.
The most recent spike in
food prices alone has shift-
ed almost 45 million peo-
ple below the poverty line,
synonymous with leading
an existence on less than
1.25 USD a day, which is
already experienced by
more than 1.2 billion peo-
ple around the world. The
tensions between supply
and demand suggest that
this is a structural imbal-
ance that will grow in the
years to come. The failure
to meet the first of the mil-
lennium development goals,
a reduction in hunger in
the world, ought to restore
a sense of urgency and de-
termination in order to
conceive and design re-
newed policies at the inter-
national level, to build a
new overview of global
food security. 
The issue of access to,
and availability of, food on
a global basis, known as
food security, has been
making headway on the
political and media agenda
since the start of the twen-
ty-first century. What now
gives cause for concern is
the increase in food price
levels and their volatility.
Since the mid-1990s we
are observing sharp peaks
in farm commodity prices
(e.g. 2007/2008 and 2010/
2011). The most recent
forecasts indicate a size-
able rise in prices for the
coming years. Despite the
debate on the role played
by the various factors in-
volved, most academics
agree that the long era of
abundant food, available
at low prices, is over, and
has given way to an era of
new scarcity. The phe-
nomenon is usually linked
to projections on demo-
graphic growth, according
to which, in 2050, there
will be more than 9 billion
inhabitants on the planet. 
In tackling the issue of
security in the food sup-
ply the analysis of popu-
lation dynamics has given
way to examination of
distribution dynamics. The
problem, as posed in re-
cent years, is not scarcity,
but the inequitable distri-
bution of food resources,
which has ended up pe-
nalizing vast populous ar-
eas in the world (De Cas-
tro et al., 2012). Such a
problem has recently been
aggravated, leading to the
number of poor, undernourished people worldwide exceed-
ing one billion. Though inter-related with the broader issue
of natural resource depletion, food scarcity assumes conno-
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Abstract
We have experienced a period of great agricultural capacity almost on a global scale,
called “the Green Revolution”. This is a term used to refer to the remarkable increase in
the world agricultural production between the early 1960s and the end of the 1980s. The
technological progress experienced in the more developed economies and its transfer to
other regions, especially Asia and Latin America, led, at that moment, to the doubling of
yields for some cereal crops which are basic for the human diet, like rice, wheat and
maize, besides the productivity of other plant species and livestock. This real production
boom has been able to meet rising food demand in the past 30 years and has also en-
sured a certain stability to food prices. What has changed? How can we account for an
alarming situation that today goes well beyond the ever-neglected issue of hunger in the
world’s poor areas? What has compromised the reaching of internationally-agreed goals
regarding the war against malnutrition? The international markets for agricultural com-
modities are the stage on which the new scarcity is shown in all its clarity. The roller-
coaster ride of commodity prices fully expresses the tensions between demand and sup-
ply which are responsible for price rises. Since for many years these changes have not
been perceived or have been at the very least underestimated, in this paper we try to ad-
dress the impact on food security in Mediterranean Countries of this “new paradigm”,
emphasizing the most critical aspect drawn from major indicators in the field.
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Résumé
Entre le début des années 1960 et la fin des années 1980, nous avons vécu une pério-
de de grande capacité agricole qui a pris une dimension presque planétaire et est con-
nue comme « Révolution verte ». Cette expression est utilisée  pour  évoquer un ac-
croissement formidable de la production agricole  mondiale.  Le progrès technologi-
que réalisé dans les économies plus avancées et son transfert vers d’autres régions, no-
tamment l’Asie et l’Amérique latine, a abouti, dans cette période, au doublement des
rendements de certaines cultures céréalières qui sont à la base de l’alimentation hu-
maine, comme le riz, le blé et le maїs, et à l’augmentation de la productivité d’autres
espèces végétales et du bétail. Ce véritable boom de la production a permis de répon-
dre à la demande alimentaire croissante  au cours des trente dernières années et d’as-
surer une certaine stabilité des prix alimentaires. Qu’est-ce qui a changé ? Comment
pouvons-nous expliquer une situation alarmante  qui, aujourd’hui, va bien au-delà de
la question jamais négligée de la faim dans les zones les plus pauvres du monde ?
Qu’est ce qui a compromis la réalisation des objectifs définis internationalement pour
lutter contre la malnutrition ?  Les marchés internationaux des produits agricoles sont
la scène où cette nouvelle  pénurie se révèle d’une manière flagrante. Les fortes fluc-
tuations des prix alimentaires reflètent clairement les tensions entre la demande et l’of-
fre qui provoquent la hausse des prix. Etant donné  que  ces changements sont passés
inaperçus pendant longtemps ou ont du moins été sous-estimés, nous essayons dans
cet article d’évaluer l’impact de ce « nouveau paradigme » sur la sécurité alimentaire
dans les pays méditerranéens, en insistant sur les aspects les plus critiques mis en év-
idence à l’aide des principaux indicateurs sur le terrain.
Mots-clés: sécurité alimentaire, consommation alimentaire, approvisionnement
alimentaire, prix alimentaires, pays méditerranéens.
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tations of greater or equal urgency compared with numer-
ous delicate problems, such as market instability and price
volatility, conveyed more loudly by public opinion. 
Economic theory tells us that the rise in prices is due to a
change in market equilibrium, caused by the increasing gap
between the demand and supply of a certain product. In the
case of agricultural markets, there are concerns regarding
the increase in food demand, which in recent years has ad-
vanced at sustained rates, especially in emerging areas,
such as the Mediterranean Partner Countries. 
In such a complex, evolving and risky context, the analy-
sis of food security and poverty need to be conducted, deep-
ening understanding of the structure of current risk man-
agement strategies. 
To emphasize the question of inequitable food distribu-
tion, it is important to recall that we have experienced a pe-
riod of great agricultural capacity almost on a global scale,
called “the Green Revolution”. This is a term used to refer
to the remarkable increase in world agricultural production
between the early 1960s and the end of the 1980s. The tech-
nological progress experienced in the more developed e-
conomies and its transfer to other regions, especially Asia
and Latin America, led at that moment to the doubling of
yields for some cereal crops which are basic for the human
diet, like rice, wheat and maize, besides the productivity of
other plant species and livestock.
This real production boom has been able to meet rising
food demand in the past 30 years and has also ensured a
certain stability in food prices. A historical phase, in which
giant steps were taken in developing pesticides and fertiliz-
ers, combined with an improvement in production tech-
niques and plant breeding, allowed a rapid growth in farm-
land yields. This is certainly not the case everywhere: in A-
sia, yield increases were obtained practically without in-
creases in cultivated areas, while in Africa yields were sta-
tionary despite the bringing into cultivation of new lands. 
However, we are talking about a quarter-century of sus-
tained yield increases, coinciding with a marked rise in
public investment in agricultural research, both in more de-
veloped and in developing countries. The result was a mean
annual global increase in cereal production of 2%, with the
highest rises in Asia (+2.5%). The Green Revolution
seemed universally to be the death knell of the Malthusian
theory of growth. 
What has changed? How can we account for an alarming
situation that today goes well beyond the ever-neglected is-
sue of hunger in the world’s poor areas? What has compro-
mised the reaching of internationally-agreed goals regard-
ing the war against malnutrition? 
The international markets for agricultural commodities
are the stage on which the new scarcity is shown in all its
clarity. The roller-coaster ride of commodity prices fully
expresses the tensions between demand and supply which
are responsible for price rises. 
It would be clear now that, referring to market instability,
one of the main drivers is the headlong growth in food con-
sumption, associated with population growth, but especial-
ly with the higher purchasing power among increasingly
broad ranges of the population in emerging countries. As
early as the mid-1990s, major increases were being wit-
nessed in the demand for some strategic agricultural com-
modities, such as wheat, whose prices had long been in con-
stant decline. Demand began to rise at an average rate of
2% per annum, especially thanks to China, India and Brazil,
able on their own to account for at least one-third of in-
creases in world requirements at that time. 
The return of scarcity 
From the early fifties there was a long period of stagnat-
ing and declining prices on agricultural markets, interrupt-
ed only by some spurt in concomitance with extraordinary
events (like the “oil shock” in the 1970s). The scenario
changes in the mid-1990s, where an inverse trend begins,
with sharp peaks in farm commodity prices in 2007/2008
and 2010/2011. The most recent forecasts indicate a size-
able rise in prices for the coming years.
Several causes are driving the increase in agricultural
commodity prices. One of the main ones is the headlong
growth in food consumption, associated with population
growth, but especially with the higher purchasing power a-
mong increasingly broad ranges of the population in e-
merging countries. According to the FAO, world population
will exceed nine billion in 2050. This represents an increase
of about one third against the current population of 6.9 bil-
lion, which will be lower than in the past. In fact, the pop-
ulation increase of over 30% predicted by the FAO for the
next 40 years is well below the relative growth in the past
four decades, during which the population more than dou-
bled. 
The largest increases will take place in developing coun-
tries, while the population in high-income economies will
remain almost stable; in some areas, especially in some re-
gions of Europe, there may even be population declines. By
contrast, in Africa the population is expected to double,
growing from one to two million by 2050. In emerging ar-
eas, growth will continue to be sustained, especially in In-
dia, while China’s growth should slow down; absolute in-
creases will remain appreciable. In these two countries,
which now make up over one-third of the world’s popula-
tion, the number of inhabitants is expected to rise from the
current 2.5 billion to 3.2 by the year 2050. 
The global effects of population increases will be strictly
linked to migration intensity between countryside and
town. Around 50% of the world’s population is now dis-
tributed in urban areas, with the other half in rural areas. In
1950 only 28% of the population lived in large urban ag-
glomerations; in 2050 this percentage is destined to reach
70%. Compared with today, there will be 19 more cities
with over ten million inhabitants and five of these will be in
Asia where the trend toward metropolitan concentration
will be particularly marked. FAO estimates the population
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reduction active in agriculture in the next 40 years at around
30%. 
The most important contribution to the global conver-
gence of diets will be made by the expansion of the middle
classes in emerging areas. Individual income in countries
like India, Brazil and China rose at sustained rates in recent
years, only to slow down, but not to stop, during this long
phase of world economic recession. The cases that stand
out most are those of China and India, which have record-
ed annual growth rates close to double figures in the years
immediately prior to the recession, and which are forecast,
according to the International Monetary Fund, to continue
their trend at least for the next 20 years. This means, on one
hand, that expenditure on food consumption will grow fast,
and on the other, that food habits change radically (the so-
called “substitution effect” explained by Engel’s Law). 
As populations gradually become richer, in their diets the
unprocessed starch products (like rice and flour) are re-
placed by products with a higher protein content (such as
meat, milk and other dairy products) and by processed
products with greater value added, promoting a process of
dietary convergence worldwide along the models of richer
populations. This trend involves several billion people in e-
merging countries, so that the demand for livestock product
is forecast to increase very fast in the coming years, with
the consequence of a multiplying effect on the demand for
some agricultural raw materials, like soya and wheat, which
are at the basis of animal feed1.
Critical situations concerning water consumption may a-
rise from overexploitation, climatic stress and pollution, in
the case where water courses receive more waste than they
can assimilate. Over the course of time, some such situa-
tions have been alleviated in many parts of the world thanks
to technological progress, which has allowed an increase of
about 700% in the storage capacity of fluvial systems in the
past 50 years, promoting economic development, especial-
ly agriculture.
By contrast, problems have become more serious in oth-
er areas, for example where economic and urban expansion
has required large quantities of water, exchanged for ever
greater doses of pollution. There are also cases where ero-
sion has led to a reduction in water availability in many
large areas of Africa, including some SEMC. This is a clear
constraint to possible expansion in the agriculture sector,
which becomes even more serious if we view the growing
negative implications accompanying the relationship be-
tween water and agriculture, starting with the Green Revo-
lution: agriculture is indirectly responsible for about 40%
of the pollution of surface water, stemming from the in-
crease in the use of chemicals, as fertilizers and pesticides,
whose use seems to intensify when areas are devoted to bio-
fuel production. 
In past years the adjustment of supply to demand was
guaranteed by technical progress. The technological
progress experienced in the more developed economies and
its transfer to other regions, has led especially to the dou-
bling of yields for some cereal crops which are basic for the
human diet, like rice, wheat and maize, besides the produc-
tivity of other plant species and livestock. The sustained
yield increases was led by a marked rise in public invest-
ment in agricultural research, both in more developed and
in developing countries. 
Now we are faced with two types of limits: on the one
hand, there is the need for more sustainable agriculture,
hence based on less use of chemical inputs, one of the main
protagonists of the Green Revolution; on the other, there is
concern at having reached a technological barrier such as to
be able to achieve only marginal short-term increases. 
The OECD and FAO recently estimated that for the com-
ing years the annual growth in production will continue to
be slower than in the past, falling from an annual average of
2.4% for the previous decade to 1.7% for the coming years.
According to many analysts, these data indicate unequivo-
cally the end of the season of the Green Revolution and the
reaching of a level of efficiency that will be hard to beat in
the short-medium term (Brown, 2012).
Also those of a contingent nature have far more impact
than in the past, since the greater integration of the econo-
my favors a more rapid transfer of signals (and shocks)
from one market to another (De Castro et. al., 2012). Such
integration is also partly responsible for another aspect of
the current scenario: market volatility. 
This term is used when the frequency and range of price
variations recorded in a given time span are greater than the
historical average. Between 2007 and 2008 the farm price
index used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rose
by 50%, to then drop sharply (without returning to its pre-
boom levels) and rise to even higher levels at the beginning
of 2011, representing a rise of 130% against 2002 levels. 
This phenomenon, depending on several causes, exacer-
bates the natural instability of agricultural markets linked to
the seasonal cycles. One cause arises from the small-scale
market, characterized by low volumes and a restricted num-
ber of exporters. Only 12% of maize and 18% of wheat are
traded on international markets; the remaining part stays
within producer countries.
This means that also in the case of modest shocks, reper-
cussions on prices may be significant and the return to e-
quilibrium may take a long time. This is what has happened
with the increasing frequency of extreme meteorological
events linked to the broader phenomenon of climate
change. 
Often reactions to these events have led to restrictions in
trade. In 2010 we experienced a new cycle of measures that
were completely uncoordinated at the international level. In
summer 2010, following huge wildfires that hit Russia and
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1 To globally satisfy a diet which will be increasingly enriched in
calories and changing in its composition, annual cereals produc-
tion will have to reach around three billion tons, about one third
higher than today, that of soya will have to increase by 140% and
that of meat will have to reach 470 million tons, 200 million more
than current production (FAO 2010).
caused damage to crops, Moscow banned grain exports,
triggering price increases. The Russian example was fol-
lowed by Ukraine, while in parallel many governments be-
gan to subsidize imports or reduce their taxation. The an-
nouncement of the ban was enough for many concerned im-
porters to begin to negotiate higher volumes than in the
past, fearing subsequent price rises. According to FAO,
world wheat prices increased by between 60 and 80% be-
tween July and September 2010 after the export ban decid-
ed by Russia.
Government reactions to price booms have aimed to sta-
bilize domestic supply as rapidly as possible by adopting
protective measures (such as bans on exports or incentives
for imports), to alleviate the impact of increases upon its c-
itizens. Yet these initiatives have had the sole result of ex-
porting instability (and inflation), taking it from national to
international markets (Tangermann, 2011), amplifying
price oscillations and triggering a vicious circle which
made the markets even more precarious.
The scenario is further complicated by the state of re-
serves of strategic agricultural products (Figure 1). Today,
the level of food reserves is much lower than in the past. In
2007 cereal reserves reached their historical minimum. This
actually made the agricultural supply even more inelastic
than it is naturally, further restricting the capacity to re-
spond to price increases.
Moreover, the role played by the financial markets during
the price rises is more hotly debated. Some governments as
well as several analysts and representatives of international
institutions have pointed the finger at financial speculation,
it being identified as one of the main drivers behind recent
booms in farm prices. 
In its broader, more authoritative strands in the economics
literature they are rather skeptical regarding the nexus of di-
rect causality which is thought by many to connect specula-
tion and price rises. The trend in futures quotations is theo-
retically tied to expectations on demand-supply relations and
thus tends to converge on the real market value of the traded
commodity as the contract expiry date approaches. 
By contrast, financial operations conducted outside com-
modity exchange circuits are different, such as in the so-
called “over the counter” (OTC) market, where it is large
institutional intermediaries which trade commodities
through non-standardized contracts and without solvency
guarantees made available by stock exchanges. This gener-
ates large risks, like those that became reality during the fi-
nancial bubble in 2007, in which the contractual reneging
of many players who had taken on excessive risks led to re-
al market failure.
The development in the analysis of the field of food se-
curity reflects the shift from a former focus on food energy
availability to a more comprehensive appraisal of this phe-
nomenon developed in recent years. 
Food security in South Mediterranean
Countries: Towards a more comprehensive
approach
In September 2000, 189 nations approved the “United
Nations Millennium Declaration’ (UNMD), which called
for halving by the year 2015 the number of people who live
on less than one dollar a day. The Millenni-
um Development Goals pointed out by the
UNMD include eight priorities: To eradi-
cate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve
universal primary education, promote gen-
der equality and empower women, reduce
child mortality, improve maternal health,
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other dis-
eases, ensure environmental sustainability
and develop a global partnership for devel-
opment. The level of these goals is meas-
ured each year using more than 60 indica-
tors2. 
What emerges by applying the upgraded
$1.25-a-day poverty line, which is used to
measure progress toward the first Millenni-
um Development Goal (MDG), is that offi-
cial poverty rates in most south Mediterranean countries are
lower than in many other low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs). Extreme poverty affects less than 3% of the
population. But going deeper into the analysis of
non–income MDG indicators, the situation changes and the
differences between south Mediterranean countries (and in
general all Arab countries) and other LMICs appears less
pronounced (IFPRI, 2012; World Bank, 2011). 
In this field, it is interesting to note that the results com-
ing out from a study conducted by the International Food
Policy Institute (IFPRI) in 20123 pointed out how poverty
and income inequality in the SEMC context are likely high-
er than official numbers have long suggested. In this study
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Figure 1 - Wheat stocks are negatively correlated with wheat prices.
Source: Our elaboration from USDA data.
2 The official list is available on http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/
Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm
3 Beyond the SEMC Awakening: Policies and Investments for Poverty
Reduction and Food Security (IFPRI 2012).
a new indicator of food insecurity risk is developed, merg-
ing a macro-level and a micro-level measure of food inse-
curity. The first one is defined as the share of food imports
divided by total exports plus net remittance inflows4, while
the prevalence of undernourished children is used for rep-
resenting the micro-level measure of food insecurity. The
result is a classification of SEMC countries into five risk
groups, based on this composed indicator. In IFPRI (2011),
it can be seen that the situation is for more deficit recorded
for Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen. The situation is relative-
ly better than these indices in Libya, Egypt, Morocco,
Tunisia, Turkey and Syria.
Mediterranean Countries and Food Security
Indicators 
This approach goes beyond the traditional micro-aspects
posing at the basis of the Global Hunger Index (GHI)5, cal-
culated each year by the International Food Policy Re-
search Institute (IFPRI). The GHI provides a multi-dimen-
sional overview of the hunger, combining three equally
weighted indicators:
– the proportion of the undernourished as a percentage of
the population, which reflects the share of the popula-
tion with insufficient dietary energy intake,
– the prevalence of underweight children under the age of
five, which indicates the proportion of children suffer-
ing from low weight with regard to the adequate weight
for their age, and
– the mortality rate of children under the age of five, re-
flecting the interaction between an inadequate energy
intake and an unhealthy environment. 
The scores for some selected North Africa and Middle
East countries, in comparison with the six countries at the
bottom of the world list in 2010, show that the situation of
South Mediterranean countries is relatively good and wide-
ly differs from the situation of those African countries that
suffer the most from food insecurity. All the selected coun-
tries are classed, in 2010, in the category of countries with
low hunger levels, with the exception of Morocco and Syr-
ia, which appear with moderate hunger levels. The best s-
cores among the SEMC correspond to Tunisia, and the
worst to Morocco, where the prevalence of underweight
children under five years of age has increased between the
average of 1988-92 and the average of 2003-08, to 9,9%.
A factor that becomes more and more crucial in measur-
ing the multiple dimension of the concept of food security
is the exposure to food import. The South Mediterranean
region is one of the most food import-dependent areas in
the world, with net food imports accounting for 25-50% of
national consumption. This result is a consequence of a
very rapid demographic growth in the last few decades
combined with the change in consumption patterns linked
to the increasing average income. A direct consequence of
this development has been the rising external food trade d-
eficits, which in general should not mean self-sufficiency d-
eficit6; in the cases of some South Mediterranean countries,
the figure gives rise to some concerns related to the high ra-
tio of food imports over total exports. In particular, in those
countries characterized with a high dependence on export
earnings from oil, the exposure to food security risks is di-
rectly related with the oil price fluctuations. The quota of
total exports used to pay for imports is higher in the SMC
than the world average. Food dependence is more pro-
nounced for the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Jordan
and Egypt than in the other countries included in the region
(Figure 2). 
Combining the number of times total exports cover food
imports with food production per capita, the GHI, and
Gross National Income per capita, on the basic distinction
grounded on the mineral resources endowment of each
country, Breisinger et al. (2010) have proposed a food se-
curity countries classification in which all the South
Mediterranean countries considered are included in the cat-
egory countries facing a food security challenge.
The most recent multi-dimensional food security indica-
tor is the Global Food Security Index (GFSI) developed by
The Economist Intelligence Unit, that considers the core is-
sues of affordability, availability, quality and safety across
a set of 105 countries (Table 1). The index is a dynamic
quantitative and qualitative benchmarking model, con-
structed from 25 unique indicators, that measures these
drivers of food security across both developing and devel-
oped countries, providing a rank of countries as a function
of their food vulnerability. The 2012 GFSI for the South
Mediterranean countries covered by the survey provides the
following result.
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4 Food imports / [total exports + net remittance inflows]
5 The GHI ranks countries on a 100-point scale. Values less than 5.0
reflect low levels of hunger, values between 5.0 and 9.9 reflect mo-
derate hunger, values between 10.0 and 19.9 indicate the presence
of a serious problem of hunger, values between 20.0 and 29.9 are
alarming, and values of 30.0 or higher are considered as extremely
alarming.
6 Food trade deficits may be an acceptable way of guaranteeing the
availability of food supplies, but only under the condition that de-
ficit-prone countries are able to generate enough foreign currency

































Figure 2 - Total exports/Food imports in SEMC (2010).
Source: Breisinger et al. (2010).
Structural factors affecting food security in
South Eastern Mediterranean Countries
The population growth rate of SEMC countries has aver-
aged 2.1% in the last seven years compared to a world rate of
1.2%. In the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries,
high population growth rates have been recorded over the past
three decades with natural growth peaks of 3% and more. Pro-
files vary widely, however. Population growth in the Maghreb
countries is controlled as the result of a steep decline in fertil-
ity rates: this is the case in Tunisia, whose population has
grown from 5 million in 1970 to 10 million at the present time
but should not exceed 15 million by 2050. Population growth
is still buoyant in most of the countries in the Near East. In
Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Territories, the annu-
al growth rate is still around 2%. Egypt, for example, which
had a population of 35 million in 1970, now has some 75 mil-
lion inhabitants, and the figure could rise to almost 120 mil-
lion by 2050. In the Near East, population trends are very cor-
related to socio-economic disparities: the demographic and
socio-economic profile of Lebanon, for instance, is far re-
moved from that of Syria.
This trend has been accompanied by a rapid urban growth
in the SEMC, where the number of city dwellers will have
doubled by 2020 compared to the figure for 1990. Yet rural ar-
eas, on the whole, are not becoming depopulated. There has
been a steep decline in the rural population in most  SEMCs
in general terms, but the relative share of the rural population
is decreasing in absolute terms as a necessary corollary of gal-
loping urbanization; rural areas have never been so populated,
particularly in the countries of the Near East and in Egypt,
where the rural population is still larger than the urban popu-
lation and farming still remains the primary activity in large
parts of this region (World Bank, 2011).
At the same time, the average income growth rate has been
roughly 3.0% in the last decade, compared to the world aver-
age of 1.1%, redrawing, hand in hand with the increasing ur-
banization, the consumption patterns of the entire region, and
leading, as previously noted, towards progressive exposure in
terms of food trade deficits.
The competition in covering soil has seen an increasing role
of the urban area, often at the expense of fertile areas. Since
this region is characterized by limited resources of arable land
and water, this means limiting options available for contribut-
ing to cover the increasing food demand. In Algeria, Jordan,
Libya and Egypt, for example, the acreage of arable land ac-
counts for less than 5% of the total area of the country. In
many of the SEMCs the arable land per capita is below the
global average and its decline has been rapid.
In order to get around water scarcity, the people of the SEM-
Cs developed efficient systems of water engineering, which
they used mainly for watering their crops (CIHEAM 2012). In
Egypt, where crops cannot grow without irrigation, numerous
techniques have been used for thousands of years to exploit Nile
spates. But it was in the 20th century that irrigation was devel-
oped most, at least in terms of areas covered. 
Irrigation is no doubt reaching its limit after years of rapid de-
velopment, particularly in SEMCs, which are amongst the least
endowed in the world in terms of available water resources: half
of the world’s “water-poor” (less than 1000 cubic meters per
capita) live in the region. The natural resources exploitation in-
dex (the ratio between the volumes abstracted and the renew-
able water resources available) gives a worrying indication of
the pressure that now weighs on water resources. Most of the
SEMCs have an exploitation index of over 50%, for instance,
but it is the situation in the east of the basin that is reason for the
greatest concern. With the exception of Lebanon and Turkey,
both of which have water resources, the indexes are already
very high (over 75%) and, to judge by trend s-
cenarios, are liable to rise further. These quanti-
tative limits are compounded by signs of dete-
rioration in water quality. The increase in the
volume of water abstracted from groundwater
aquifers, for example, makes these aquifers
more sensitive to marine intrusion.
Food dependency and price
pass-through
As seen previously, SEMCs are particularly
concerned about food security because they
are highly dependent on international com-
modity markets. The level of exposure is di-
rectly related both to the ratio of food imports
to total exports and the fiscal balances. 
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Algeria 40.1 38,2 39,1 47,6 72 
Egypt 50,4 38,1 59,8 55,3 52 
Morocco 49,1 49,5 47,5 52,6 57 
Tunisia 52,2 52 48,6 66 49 
Turkey 62,2 55,6 66,6 66,2 33 
Jordan 49,8 51,8 49 47,1 49 
Syria 40,9 33,6 44,9 47,9 70 
Table 1 - Global Food Security Index in some SEMC (2012).
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Figure 3 - Total population growth and projections.
Source: FAO.
SEMCs are the largest net importers of cereal calories in
the world, importing roughly 56% of the cereal calories
they consume. This dependence on foreign markets con-
cerns all countries of the south Mediterranean region,
which are the world’s largest net importers of cereal calo-
ries, buying on the international market more than 50% of
the cereal-consumed calories. Wheat represents a signifi-
cant part of the SEMC diet, reaching in the case of Tunisia
roughly 50% of the total consumed calories.
The exposure of SEMC countries to world food price
volatility is firstly linked to their high dependence on the
external market. The World Bank (2012) has calculated the
ratios of net imports to domestic consumption, as indicative
of the dependency on foreign imports to satisfy domestic
food demand7. The results show that dependence on food
imports in general is high across SEMCs. 
Conclusion and Policy recommendations
The exposure of MPCs to world food price volatility is
firstly linked to their high dependence on the external mar-
ket (see Figure 10.2 above). The World Bank (2012) has
calculated the ratios of net imports to domestic consump-
tion, as indicative of the dependency on foreign imports to
satisfy domestic food demand. The results show that de-
pendence on food imports in general is high across MPCs.
This situation shall produce, in the case of price shock,
dramatic consequences in terms of food inflation. The MPC
region is the largest wheat importer in the world, and wheat
prices increased by 70% in the
second half of the 2000s. The in-
cidence of food consumption in
the basket household expenditures
in MPCs in fact accounts for be-
tween 30% and 50%, and conse-
quently food inflation often repre-
sents the most important compo-
nent of the overall inflation. 
It is well known that the effects
on the field of food security are
strictly correlated with the income
distribution among the popula-
tion. The question of the high con-
centration of households living n-
ear the poverty line that character-
izes the MPC area would repre-
sent, in the case of prolonged
price shock, a threat in increasing
the severity of poverty levels (IF-
PRI, 2012). About half of the pop-
ulations of the MPCs live in rural
areas, and within this category the
agricultural sector plays a key role in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia
and Morocco. Therefore, we need to emphasize that rural
poverty is at the core of food security problems in the re-
gion, and recent rises in food prices have contributed to an
increase in the incidence, depth and severity of poverty.
Some preliminary analyses carried out during the last years
have stressed the link between an increase in food prices
and an increase in poverty in these countries; these results
suggested that about a 30% increase in food prices in Egypt
would result in a 12%-point increase in poverty, and a 14%
increase in food prices in Morocco would result in a 4%-
point increase in poverty (World Bank, 2011).
Furthermore, the tight supply available on the food com-
modity market for certain strategic products, like cereals,
increases the risk of disruptions in procurement and short-
falls in food availability in countries with high food de-
pendency ratios (World Bank and FAO 2012). A further
point which should be emphasized is the similarity, often
misleading, of the concept of food security compared with
self-sufficiency; indeed, food trade deficits may be an ac-
ceptable way of guaranteeing the availability of food sup-
plies, but only under the condition that deficit-prone coun-
tries are able to generate enough foreign currency to pay for
their imports. In practice it means being able to keep a relative-
ly low ratio of food imports over total exports. In this context,
MPCs are currently using 11.5% of their total exports to pay for
their food imports. As underlined by the joint World
Bank/IFAD/FAO report on improving food security in MPCs
(World Bank, 2009), food security in the region is determined
by resource endowments which affects the level of food import
requirements, and also by fiscal balance which influences a
country’s ability to afford food imports. 
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Mi7 The dependency ratio is calculated as: Di = –– where Mi is netCi
imports of food product I, Ci is the domestic consumption, with I
corresponding to grains, edible oils, meat, and sugar.
Country/
Food Item







Shares Country/ Food Item








Grains 68% 52% 52% Grains 87% 39% 32%
Oils 88% 22% 18% Oils 38% 7% 8%
Meat 33% 7% 15% Meat 56% 38% 49%
Sugar 89% 19% 15% Sugar 100% 10% 11%
Food 69% 100% 100% Food 70% 100% 100%
Grains 100% 28% 25% Grains 51% 57% 61%
Oils n/a n/a n/a Oils 50% 24% 21%
Meat 88% 62% 65% Meat n/a n/a n/a
Sugar 100% 10% 9% Sugar 57% 19% 18%
Food 92% 100% 100% Food 89% 100% 100%
Grains 39% 54% 62% Grains 51% 53% 62%
Oils 78% 27% 14% Oils 6% 7% 19%
Meat 37% 10% 13% Meat n/a n/a n/a
Sugar 37% 9% 11% Sugar 104% 27% 16%
Food 33% 100% 100% Food 43% 100% 100%
Grains 97% 42% 35% Grains 68% 58% 63%
Oils 68% 17% 20% Oils 73% 15% 22%
Meat 25% 27% 34% Meat n/a n/a n/a
Sugar 98% 14% 11% Sugar 104% 27% 10%
Food 67% 100% 100% Food 43% 100% 100%





Table 2 - Food Dependency Ratios, Import, and Consumption Share for 2010.
This means that vulnerability to food price shock is basically
influenced by the import dependence, as well as the fiscal posi-
tion of the considered country. High import dependence associ-
ated with a sound fiscal position is not of concern, except in the
case of quantity shock such as export bans (African Develop-
ment Bank, 2012). 
Global price movements in some strategic agricultural prod-
ucts markets is one important source in conditioning domestic
price levels, accompanied by others linked to country-specific
factors, including public policy measures. 
Therefore, programs need to be targeted to the poor because
they are most affected by price shocks, spending proportionately
more on staple foods. Most cash-transfer programs in the region
are small, amounting to less than 1% of GDP in most cases. Most
programs use categorical targeting approaches. Households and
individuals are entitled to benefits if they fall into eligible cate-
gories, such as single mother, widow, unemployed, elderly, or
disabled. These categories are not limited to the poor, and do not
necessarily cover the poorest sectors of the population.
Strategic wheat reserves require sound management in order
to mitigate import supply and price risks effectively. 
Mismanagement of strategic reserves may outweigh the ben-
efits of maintaining wheat stocks, ultimately weakening a coun-
try’s food security (Murphy 2009). To ensure a well managed
reserve, each country must establish a set of guiding principles
regarding when to draw down stocks and when to replenish, as-
suming the first-in-first-out (FIFO) principle. These guidelines
must be clear and must be designed with the objective of miti-
gating supply and price risks, and the purchasing and selling of
the wheat reserves must be done in a competitive and transpar-
ent market. In addition, to ensure that wheat is accessible when
needed, it is important to make sure that all stakeholders are
well informed about the guidelines and that staff located both at
the site of the reserves and in back offices are properly trained.
Lastly, the management of wheat reserves must be adequately
financed (Murphy, 2009). 
Three factors must be considered in establishing the guide-
lines for the reserves: the threshold domestic price that will trig-
ger the draw-down of wheat reserves, the target reserve level,
and the rate of reserves replenishment. A recent analysis (Lar-
son et al. 2011) argues that selecting a higher threshold domes-
tic price turns the reserve into more of a safety net to be used in
emergency situations rather than as a tool for price stabilization;
with a high threshold price, strategic reserves may not have
much of an impact on domestic price volatility as long as prices
remain below the threshold. The larger the targeted size of the
reserve, the more costly it will be to maintain, but the more
food-security coverage the reserve will provide. Lastly, a more
aggressive rate of building up and replenishing the reserves is
more likely to smooth domestic price volatility, as there is less
chance of there being insufficient reserves. However, replenish-
ing reserves increases demand from international markets,
which may aggravate international price volatility.
The appropriate management structure of the reserve is spe-
cific to each country and should be designed to minimize costs,
ensure food safety, and reduce distortive impacts of stock poli-
cies on grain markets (Rashid and Lemma, 2011). Once the s-
trategic reserve policy is established, there may be opportunities
to create public-private partnerships (PPPs) for management.
The government could pay private operators to manage logis-
tics and storage operations for strategic stocks, or it could play
a more limited role, getting involved only during severe price
and supply shocks.
Improving the design of safety nets dampens the effects of
food-price shocks and prevents them from doing permanent
harm. 
Strengthening program coordination and enhancing payment
mechanisms improves resource efficiency. At the policy level,
program coordination needs to be improved to reduce overlap-
ping beneficiaries and mandates that waste resources, imple-
menting safety nets that are flexible enough to be scaled up
when shocks strike and scaled down when they recede. 
This is important because scalability enables relief for the vul-
nerable when prices are high and a reduction in the fiscal bur-
den when prices are low. If possible, existing targeted cash-
transfer programs should be the prime candidates to be scaled
up. These include poverty-focused social assistance, as well as
social pensions, unemployment assistance, and disability pen-
sions. Where public workfare is already part of the safety net, it
may be useful to expand program reach. The next most desir-
able candidate would be food stamps or other near-cash assis-
tance that could be targeted and scaled up or down. Direct sub-
sidies and food distribution would be the least desirable option,
only advisable when food markets are functioning poorly or
when subsidies are the only available safety net.
Agricultural markets in MPCs nowadays still appear organi-
zationally and structurally weak: the role of the policy maker is
therefore one of a great responsibility. 
International coordination of measures is required to prevent
unilateral actions (such as export bans) aimed at promoting food
security within particular areas that end up destabilizing the
global food supply and increasing the size of those populations
at risk from hunger and malnutrition. As recently pointed out
by leading scholars in agricultural economics, trade policy
initiatives aimed at reducing the impacts of price increases
have been a major stimulus to the increases that immediate-
ly followed. In particular, the adoption of restrictive meas-
ures exacerbated the price increase trend. 
A further important topic to be taken into account is the
management of risks. The large exposure of the agricultural
sector to risks related to natural events and the instability of
the market still require a significant public intervention. As
pointed out by our field research on poverty, food security and
risk management in MPCs, there is a lack of a solid structure
to help farmers in managing risks. This in turn exposes MPCs
to risks of disasters, reduction in productive potential, vulner-
ability and food insecurity.
An appropriate intervention strategy would be to ensure a
fair functioning of markets. The incentives must drive the
adoption of practices and technologies to increase yields and
have less impact, as well as compensating farmers for the en-
vironmental benefits they produce. In other words, support
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policies should be directed towards the stabilization of in-
comes rather than the market, using intelligent, flexible meas-
ures. Among them a special role needs to be played by the
tools of risk management. Access to the opportunities offered
by traditional devices for risk transfer to third parties, such as
insurance, should also play a part.
The presentation in the previous pages has stressed the
questions of how to assess the impact of economic shocks, of
which price volatility may be a symptom, on food security.
Two main conclusions can be drawn at this point. The first
is that data availability, in terms of both quality and coverage,
is still an important limitation for our collective ability to con-
duct a meaningful and timely analysis of relevant socio-eco-
nomic phenomena such as food security. If not properly rec-
ognized, mistaken inferences can be drawn. The question is
that the role of theory as a guiding principle is of fundamen-
tal importance. By making extended reference to the debate
on the practice of food insecurity assessment, we hope to have
demonstrated how the risk of slipping away from proper in-
ference is always waiting for us just around the corner.
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